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TAXATION
I. LEGISLATION
While several statutes dealing with taxation were enacted
during this past year, only a few appear to be of any general
interest. A corporation no longer has to make a declaration of
estimated taxes if the estimated taxes are less than one hundred
dollars.1 A new method has been devised to determine "in tran-
sit" property for property tax purposes.2 Also the three year
statute of limitations for assessment of additional income taxs
was clarified by indicating that as between the time filed or the
time due, it was the time which occurred later that controlled.4
The South Carolina Tax Study Commission was dissolved
and most of its major recommendations were not enacted this
past year. The recommended plan passed last year for equalizing
public service corporations with other corporations 6  was
amended slightly7-in one place to conform to the Study Com-
mission's original recommendation." Also the Study Commis-
sion's recommendation for a uniform property tax assessment
ratio of ten percent was adopted for merchant's inventory,
equipment and furniture and fixtures,9 and in line with the gen-
eral theme of uniform property taxation of businesses, the Tax
Commission was given the power to equalize and assess both real
and personal property of a manufacturer except in the case of
inventory not offered for retail sale.10
II. Juwmci DFCsIos
A. Taxability of Eceess Above Par of Sock Dividends.
A license is levied upon the "capital stock and paid-in as
surplus" accounts of most chartered and domesticated corpora-
l. LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 641 (No. 444 1967).
2. The "no situs" property is determined by dividing the total property
shipped in South Carolina into the total property shipped outside of the state
using a period not in excess of thirty-six months and applying this fraction to
the ending inventory. LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 553 (No. 382 1967).
3. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 65-322 (1962).
4. LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 495 (No. 352 1967).
5. They included a gift tax, enlargement of the power of the Tax Board of
Review, a simplified income tax coordinated with the federal income tax,
supervision of tax practitioners, and taxation of electric cooperatives. See gen-
erally Taxation, Survey of S.C. Law, 19 S.C.L. Rrv. 109 (1967).
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-256.1 to -256.4 (Supp. 1966).
7. LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 495, 554 (Nos. 351, 383 1967).
8. SOUTH CAROLiNA TAx COMM'N SEVENTH ANN. REP. 72 (1966).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-1668 (Supp. 1966). The Tax Study Commission's
hope was to have all property assessed with a uniform assessment ratio.
10. LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 710 (No. 476 1967).
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tions in South Carolina." These accounts generally appear on
the books of a corporation using par-value stock when the stock
of the corporation is issued for consideration, with the portion
equal to the par value of the stock being credited to the capital
stock account and the excess above par being credited to the
paid-in surplus account.
In Gulf Oil Corporation v. South Carolina Tax CommSsion 
2
the taxpayer had issued a stock dividend. There was no question
that the amount equal to the par value of the stock distributed
and therefore credited to the capital stock account was taxable;
the litigation involved the taxation of the excess above pai of
the stock dividend which the taxpayer had classified as "other
capital" on its books.
Since the statute'3 had not defined paid-in surplus, the court
looked to Webster's Dictionary for the corporate understanding
of the word and concluded that paid-in surplus resulted only
from the "sale, or exchange or issuance at a price above par of
the corporate stock"' 4 and not from a stock dividend. Nor did
the fact that section 65-607 expressly listed transactions that
were not paid-in surplus 5 necessarily imply that just because a
stock dividend was not included therein, it would create taxable
paid-in surplus.
This case is important in that many stock dividends are issued
using stock that has a nominal par value. In such cases, as a
result of a stock dividend, a large amount is transferred from
the earned surplus account to an account that is not taxable
under section 65-606. This result may not be unjust since the
same amount that escapes taxation was not taxed when that
amount was in the earned surplus account.
B. Estoppel of the State and Deduction of Taxes and Insurance
Reserves.
In ColoniaZ Life & Accident Insurance Company v. South
Carolina Tax Commission,' a case which raises four tax issues,
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-606 (1962).
12. 248 S.C. 267, 149 S.E.2d 642 (1966).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-606 (1962).
14. Gulf Oil Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 248 S.C. 267, 271, 149
S.E.2d 642, 644 (1966).
15. Paid in surplus, for the purpose of this section, shall not include any
capital surplus created by reason of a reorganization, consolidation, or
merger except such surplus as may result from a decrease of capital as
an incident to such reorganization, consolidation or merger.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-607 (1962).
16. 248 S.C. 334, 149 S.E.2d 777 (1966).
[Vol. 19
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 4 [1967], Art. 12
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss4/12
TA XATION SURIEYED
an agent of the Tax Commission had in 1958 agreed with Colon-
ial on a method to compute its liability. Four years later this
method was rejected by the Commission and a deficiency assess-
ment plus interest was made based upon a new calculation. As
a general rule a governmental authority cannot be estopped in
enforcing its tax laws by previous acts of its agents17 and the
court held that the general rule should be followed even when
reliance is based upon a method of computation rather than an
erroneous calculation of the Tax Commission. The taxpayer was
not charged interest on the deficiency, however, since the court
viewed the interest statute' 8 as a penalty.
The taxpayer also contended that it should be allowed a full
deduction under section 65-259(4)19 for South Carolina taxes
paid mainly on property and employees at its South Carolina
home office. The Commission asserted that taxes paid for the
home office should be allocated to other states on the basis of
income since the home office activities benefited the activities
of the company in the other states. The court held that the Com-
mission had full power and the duty to prescribe a method for
arriving at a tax base which reasonably represented the propor-
tion of business within the state and its determination would
not be disturbed unless shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory
or unreasonable.20
The court also disallowed as deductions certain additions
Colonial had made to its insurance reserves. Section 37-130.1
allows a domestic life insurance company to deduct any additions
to its policy reserves. All other insurance companies can deduct
only an "addition to unearned premium reserves."12 1 Colonial
17. E.g., Heyward v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 240 S.C. 347, 126 S.E.2d
15 (1962); Baker v. South Carolina Highway Dept., 166 S.C. 481, 165 S.E.
197 (1932) ; Powell v. Board of Comm'n of Police Ins., 210 S.C. 136, 41 S.E.2d
780 (1947) (dictum); Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 338 (1948).
18. "[P]rovided, that interest at the rate of six per cent per annum shall be
paid on any tax due from the date that return and tax was originally due to the
date of payment." S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-130.4 (1962).
19. The actual taxing statute is section 37-130.1; however, the license is lim-
ited to five percent of net income as determined by Chapter 5 of Title 65.
20. Section 65-222.2, upon which the court relied, provides that if a domestic
corporation does business both within and without the state, the tax shall be
imposed upon a base which reasonably represents the proportion of the trade
or business carried on within the state.
21. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 37-1302 (1962).
"Unearned premium reserves" are basically and in general terms reserves
set up or allocated by the insurance company representing such propor-
tions of premiums as the unexpired portion of the period for which pre-
mium has been paid bears to the entire term covered by premium
payments. For example, if a year's premium has been paid in advance
1967].,
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contended that since it did life insurance business,22 it was a
"life insurance company" and could deduct additions to reserves
for unreported and unpaid claims for all its business. The court
held that since the Legislature had expressly differentiated be-
tween the kinds of reserves, the Commission was correct in
allowing Colonial a deduction of reserve additions only for its
life insurance business and in limiting reserve deductions in con-
nection with their other business to additions to unearned pre-
mium reserves.
Section 37-130.1 also specifies that additions to the reserves
for life insurance business be "required by the Commissioner."
One addition in question had been "required" by the Superin-
tendent of Insurance of Missouri, but the portion of this addition
allocable to South Carolina had only been "adopted" by the
South Carolina Commissioner. Therefore, the South Carolina
portion was not deductible in computing South Carolina tax.
0. Tam Procedure-Necessity of Paying Under Protest.
Under the main statutory approach to obtaining a South Caro-
lina tax refund, the tax is paid under protest and a suit brought
within thirty days.23 Another provision2 4 allows a refund with-
out payment under protest when the Commissioner directs the
refund after a hearing determining that the tax has been paid
under an erroneous, improper, or illegal assessment. Attempts to
make this latter section an administrative alternative to the
payment under protest provision recently failed. Section 65-2681
was limited by the South Carolina Supreme Court as being
applicable only to property taxes25 and then only to issues in-
volving the valuation of property taxes.26
and six months of that time has elapsed the unearned premium would be
one-half of the year's premium.
Brief for Appellant at 13, Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. South Caro-
lina Tax Comm'n, 248 S.C. 334, 149 S.E.2d 777 (1966).
22. About three percent of its total business.
23. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 65-2661 to -2667 (1962).
24. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 65-2681 to -2685 (1962).
25. City of Columbia v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 245 S.C. 119, 139 S.E2d 529
(1964).
26. Owings Mills, Inc. v. Brady, 154 S.E2d 560 (S.C. 1967). Owings Mills,
Inc. v. Brady, 246 S.C. 361, 143 S.E.2d 717 (1965). The 1965 case decided there
had been a substantial question raised as to the authority of the Tax Commission
to order a refund under § 65-2682 when property valuation was not the issue.
In the second case the supreme court reversed the circuit court's determination
that the Commission had authority to order a refund, relying upon its first
decision.
[V'ol. 19
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In Vance v. &outhb Carolina Ta= Commigsion2 7 a tax refund
issue was raised under the payment under protest provision and
also under a section that has been repealed. The taxpayer was
seeking a refund because the final determination of decedent's
federal estate tax was considerably less than the tentative tax
paid, thereby reducing the eighty per cent credit allowed on the
federal tax return for state taxes paid.28 The existing South
Carolina estate tax structure was set up so that the state tax
was dependent on this federal credit29-the state tax being equal
to eighty per cent of the federal estate tax-thus allowing the
state government to receive what would otherwise have gone
to the federal government.
The court had little difficulty in holding that the state should
base the South Carolina tax on the final federal determination
and not on the amount paid under the tentative tax; however,
the court was then faced with the more difficult question of
what remedy the taxpayer could pursue to obtain this refund.
A basic principle of tax law is that a taxpayer cannot sue a
sovereign unless he has paid the tax involuntarily" or unless
the sovereign consents by statute to be sued for a refund. 1' The
state contended that the taxpayer had an adequate remedy
under existing statutes, section 65-2661 or sections 65-509 to
-510,32 and not having pursued any such remedy, he should be
barred. The court allowed the refund. The consent of the state
to be sued arose by implication from the terms of the statute and
it was upon this implied consent that the taxpayer could recover.
Whether this case is unique remains to be seen, but it might
provide the court with a precedent for allowing a refund to a
taxpayer with a meritorious claim who has not paid under pro-
test or who cannot take advantage of the narrow administrative
remedy of section 65-2681 open only to cases concerning valua-
tion of property taxes.33
27. 153 S.E2d 841 (S.C. 1967).
28. INT. Ryv. CODE OF 1954 § 2011. Since the additional estate tax has been
combined with the basic estate tax, the credit is no longer eighty percent of
the total tax; however, it is still eighty percent of the basic tax. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954 § 2011(d).
29. XXXIX S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 1768 (No. 960 1936) (repealed 1961).
30. Annot., 64 A.L.R. 9 (1930).
31. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 65-342.2, 65-386, 65-1457, 65-2661, 65-2681
(1962).
32. Code of 1952 (repealed 1961).
33. Note the trial court's grounds for a refund: (1) a common law right of
action and (2) the retention of the taxpayer's funds by the state which consti-
tuted a taldng of private property without just compensation and without due
19671
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D. Tax Accounting-Effect of Undetermined Consideration on
Earning of Income.
When property is sold and part of the consideration is de-
ferred, a problem arises as to whether the tax should be paid on
the total purchase price in the year the transaction occurred or
when the actual payment is received. For federal income tax
purposes the proper treatment will generally depend upon the
accounting method of the taxpayer.3 4 The accrual method tax-
payer will be taxed on the entire amount receivable in the year
the transaction occurred,3 5 but if the taxpayer is on the cash
basis3" or has qualified to use the installment method,37 then
income is taxable in the year payment is received. The South
Carolina court, however, did not consider it "logical"38 that the
legislature should favor a cash basis taxpayer over an accrual
one and in Adams v. Burts" the court, in determining the effec-
tive date of section 65-258(5), treated a cash basis taxpayer using
the installment method as an accrual one and held that a tax-
payer who had sold some timber with deferred payments had
"earned" the income in the year the sale was made rather than
in the years the payments were received.
Hunt v. South Carolina Tax Commis-ion4 ° involved a situa-
tion similar to the Adams case, supra, in that the cash basis
taxpayer had made a sale with deferred payments prior to the
effective date of section 65-258(5) and if the income was
"earned" in the year of the sale, then the taxpayer would lose
the benefit of an exclusion of one-half of the gain on payments
received after 1960.
In Hunt the future compensation for the sale was to be deter-
mined by royalties based upon the number of items manufac-
tured and sold, with each year having a minimum requirement
process of law. The supreme court felt it unnecessary to decide whether a refund
could be obtained under these theories, since they had decided the case on the
basis of implied consent.
34. Cf. Helvering v. Nibley-Mimnaugh Lumber Co., 70 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.
1934). Harold W. Johnston, 14 T.C. 560 (1950).
35. Id., George L. Castner Co., 30 T.C. 1061 (1958) (repudiating Titus,
infra.). Contra, C.V. Titus, Inc., 33 B.T.A. 928 (1936).
36. If, however, anything is given that is considered the "equivalent of cash"
(e.g., a note) then income will immediately be earned. P-H FEuERAL TAXEs
5f 6202, at 6166. A mere contractual obligation is not the "equivalent of cash".
E.g., Nina J. Ennis, 17 T.C. 465 (1951).
37. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 453.
38. Adams v. Burts, 245 S.C. 339, 343, 140 S.E.2d 586, 589 (1965).
39. 245 S.C. 339, 140 S.E.2d 586 (1965).
40. 153 S.E.2d 321 (S.C. 1967).
Vol. 19
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of units that, had to be paid for. It was on this basis that the
court distinguished the Adams case, in which the payments were
fixed when the contract was signed. Since in Hunt the consid-
eration was dependent upon an unknown factor, it had not been
fixed at the time the contract was consummated, and therefore
the right to receive it had not accrued. The court rejected the
trial court's theory that the amount equal to the minimum re-
quirement had accrued at the execution of the contract since
it felt that the obligation was not divisible.
While a very strict reading of Adams arguably might favor
the lower court's approach, perhaps the supreme court was con-
fining Adams. Although if the court had seriously questioned
the correctness41 of the Adams case and had noted that a cash
basis taxpayer by definition earns income when payment is
actually received,42 the reasoning might have been based on
sounder tax and accounting principles.
E. License Based o'n Prior Year's Business-Effect of Purchase
of Another Business.
At 11:59 P.M. on December 31, 1962, Eagle Fire Insurance
Company sold its Columbia business to Niagara Fire Insurance
Company. The City of Columbia imposed a business license upon
gross premiums collected during the preceding year, and a dis-
pute arose as to whether the gross premiums of Eagle for 1962
should be included in Niagara's license computation. In City of
Co7umbia 'v. Niagara Fire Insurance Oompany43 the court fol-
lowed every decision that had come to its attention from other
jurisdictions44 and held "that an insurance company which takes
over another's business at the beginning of the license year or
at the end of the preceding year is liable for a license fee based
upon the volume of the business as so combined."4 5 Implicit in
the license was a purpose to use the prior year's volume not as
41. See Randall, Taxation, Survey of S.C. Law, 18 S.C.L. REv. 131, 138-40
(1966).
42. Johnson v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 235 S.C. 155, 160-61, 110 S.E.2d
173, 175-76 (1959).
43. !54 S.E2d 674 (S.C. 1967).
44. Houseal v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 277 Ala. 140, 167 So. 2d 708 (1964);
Rinehart v. Reliance Ins. Co., 273 Ala. 535, 142 So. 2d 254 (1962) ; Lincoln
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 10 IIl. 2d 489, 140 N.E.2d 687 (1957) ; Insurance
Co. of N. America v. Long, 215 Tenn. 642, 389 S.W2d 245 (1965); Great
American Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 449, 90 S.E2d 108 (1955).
45. City of Columbia v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 154 S.E2d 674, 676-77 (S.C.
1967).
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the subject of the tax but as a reasonable, fair basis to estimate
the volume of business during the license year.
F. Statutory Interpretation.
Since tax law is chiefly statutory, many cases can be decided
by the normal process of statutory interpretation. In Ryder
Truck Lines, Inw. v. South Carolina Tax Commission,46 the prin-
ciple of ejusdem generis was used by the court in holding that
a motor carrier of freight was a business engaged in some "other
form of public service" 47 within an income tax statute48 taxing
similar businesses. This caused the corporation to be taxed under
this section rather than under the more favorable section 65-222.
In York County Fair Association, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax
Commission4" the taxpayer was not exempted from paying tax
because it did not clearly fit within the language of the statute
exempting from income tax any labor, agricultural or horticul-
tural organization having no earnings which inure to the benefit
of any private stockholder or member.50 The fair association was
owned by an American Legion Post-a "private" organization.
In Beach v. Livingston5' there was no ambigiuty in the ad-
mission statute which defined the taxable event, "admission,"
as "the right or privilege to enter into or use a place or loca-
tion."53 The taxpayer could not be refunded his five-cent tax
after making "use" of a bowling facility in bowling a forty-five
cent game.
WIrA S. ELDER
46. 248 S.C. 148, 149 S.E.2d 435 (1966).
47. "The basis of ascertaining the net taxable income of every' corporation
engaged in the business of operating a steam or electric railroad, navigation
company, waterworks company, light or gas company, express telephone or
telegraph business, sleeping car company or other form of public service ...."
48. S.C. CoDE AN. § 65-256 (1962). As mentioned in the Legislative sec-
tion, public service corporations are now given a more favorable treatment.
49. 154 S.E.2d 361 (S.C. 1967).
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-226(8) (1962).
51. 248 S.C. 135, 149 S.E2d 328 (1966).
52. S.C. CoDE Aim. § 65-802 (1962).
53. S.C. CODE AN. § 65-801(1) (1962) (emphasis added).
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